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ABSTRACT
The financial behavior of corporations has changedgreatly in the last
ten years. Previously most of the cash that stockholders received from
corporations took the form of dividends, and economists' models that have
div-idends as the ultimate determinant of equity values were not faroff the
mark. This paper documents how much things have changed. Thereare strong
tax incentives for nondividend cash payments between corporations and
shareholders. These payments can take the form of a repurchaseby the company
of its own shares, or the acquisition of the shares in anothercompany.
There has been tremendous growth in the magnitude of nondividend cash
payments. In the early 1970s these payments amounted to roughly 15percent of
dividends. By 1984, they exceeded dividends, and in 1985 the amountedto $120
billion, or almost 50 percent more than total dividends in theeconomy.
The paper shows that dividends per unit equity have not fallen.Rather,
the acquisition of equity has allowed firms to retainrelatively constant debt
equity ratios in the past five years despite strong equity markets. Firms
have chosen to absorb equity and issue debt, roughly holdingleverage
constant, and have thus saved large amounts of taxes.
The paper estimates that the cost to the Treasury oftreating share
purchase payments differently than dividends was more than $25 billion in
1985. It also finds that future corporate tax collections aresignificantly
reduced by the resulting decline in corporate equity.
The paper suggests that the existing model of dividend drivenequity
valuation must be discarded. It simply is not consistent with the facts.
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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE FINANCE
AND TAX AVOIDANCE: SOME EVIDENCE
by
John B. Shoven*
"You know something is happening, but you don't know what itis,
do you Mr. Jones." Ballad of a Thin Man, Bob Dylan, 1965.
The financial behavior of corporations has changedgreatly in the last
ten years. Previously, most of the cash that stockholdersreceived from
corporations took the form of dividends, and the dividend cash flowwas the
ultimate determinant of the value of equities.Recently, as this paper will
document, dividends have been surpassed by nondividend cash distributionsto
shareholders. These distributions are the sum of sharerepurchases and cash
mergers. In 1985, more than half of the money received by shareholders from
corporations was for the acquisition of shares.
The growth of nondividend cash payments to shareholders hasmajor
consequences for our understanding of share valuation and investment, as well
as for revenue projections of the U.S. Treasury. In particular, thefact that
the financial behavior of companies has changed sosignificantly (and without
much recognition) calls into question the forecasts that thenew tax law will
increase corporate tax collections by $120 billion. In orderto predict tax
collections in a new tax environment, one has to understand the behaviorof
firms. And, in terms of payments to stockholders, the timesare changing.
Dividends have been central to economists' models of the valuation of
corporate equity. In fact, the value of a share of a corporation's stock is—2—
taken to be the present discounted value of future cash payments to be
received by the owners of that share, where those cash payments are taken to
be dividends. Further, the value of equity is important to the economy. One
leading model of corporate investment has investment depending crucially on
the financial valuation of the firm (see, for example, Tobin (1969) or Summers
(1981)). Thus, we have dividends being the fundamental determinant of share
value and share value being an important factor in the strength of investment.
There are problems, however, with pursuing this line of reasoning
further. Certainly, the financial valuation of the firm is the present value
of the properly discounted stream of cash payments returned to investors. The
first problem with the model driven by dividends is that a large fraction of
the cash payments to stockholders do not take the form of dividends, as this
paper will document. Presumably, these other cash payments are determinants
of the value of corporate equity. The second problem is that, as a
profession, we do not have a very good explanation for the payment of
dividends in the first place. Under the current tax code, dividends are a
distinctly tax-disadvantaged way to transmit cash between the firm and its
investors relative to other available financial strategies. Their existence
presumably indicates either that dividends convey a valuable signal to
stockholders about the management's perception of future earnings prospects
(Miller and Rock (1984)) or that the payment of dividends restricts the
actions of management in a nianner which helps reduce the control problems
brought about by the separation of management and ownership (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). Whether these explanations are adequate to account for the
actual level of dividends, given their tax handicap, has continued to be—3-
debated.
The tax problem with equity financing in general, and dividendpaying
equity in particular, is that two levels of taxation must bepaid on the
incremental earnings resulting from investments financedby these means.
First, the corporation income tax applies with a federalmarginal tax rate of
46 percent. Second, the remaining 54 percent ofearnings are subject to the
personal income tax if the investor is a household and if the fundsare paid
out as a dividend. Even if the money is retained at thecorporate level, it
will be implicitly taxed; the market will capitalize the factthat eventually
it will be subject to personal dividend taxation when it isremitted to
shareholders. Thus, an after corporate tax dollar in thecorporate treasury
will be valued at less than a dollar. If dividendsare the only means of
returning cash to investors, an after corporate tax dollar will be valuedat
the ratio of one minus the marginal personal tax rate ofshareholders to one
minus the effective marginal tax rate on accruedcapital gains. However, the
assumption that dividends are the only way to return cash to a firm's
financiers is incorrect.
An alternative strategy, of course, is to use debt finance.Its
advantage is that interest payments are deductible from thecorporation income
tax and thus the return to debtholders is subject toonly personal taxation.
Most models of optimal corporate financial structure involve thefirm trading
off the tax advantages of debt against itsinflexibility and hence the
increased chance of incurring the costs associated with bankruptcy.1The
taxation of debt at the personal level may be reducedby the use of pension
funds and other retirement accumulation tax shelters.-4-
Even for equity, there are ways other than dividends to return cash to
stockholders which involve far lower total taxes and, therefore, more value to
investors. One such method is the repurchase of shares by the company. In
the absence of information problems between stockholders and management, and
in the absence of taxes and transaction costs, dividends and share repurchase
programs are equivalent. If a company uses the same amount of money to buy
back shares or pay dividends, the total value of the firm will be the same
after either transaction. It will have the same debt-equity ratio, the same
real assets, the same opportunities, and therefore the same value. In the
share repurchase case, each shareholder can sell sufficient shares to match
the cash flow he would have received in the dividend case. In the dividend
case, the dividend recipient can use the proceeds to buy additional shares in
the company and therefore match the percentage interest he would have had if
he had been one of the stockholders who did not sell in a share repurchase
program.
Taxes cause a major break in this equivalence to the disadvantage of
dividends and, therefore, to the relative advantage of share repurchase. It
is still true that the total equity value of the firm should be the same after
the payment of an equivalent amount of cash in either dividend or share
repurchase form. This equivalence rests on the idea that the firm has the
same assets, capital structure, and future opportunities in either case. If
the cash was paid out as a dividend, then it is fully taxable with the
exception of the modest $100 exclusion offered under current law. However, if
it was paid out as a repurchase, the payment results -in a capital gain to
shareholders of the amount of the purchase. However, most of this capital-5--
Table 1
Example of Dividend Payment and Share Repurchase for Hypothetical Firm
Initial Financing ioo shares
Profit $1/share $100
Value at End of Year $11/share $1,100
Strategy A: Strategy B:
$1 Dividend Repurchase $100 Worth
Payment/Share of Shares
Cash Received
by Shareholders sioo $100
Value of Firm
after Transaction i,ooo 1,000
Number of Shares ioo 90.91
Price per Share sio $11
Taxes Owed* $35 $1.27
Accrued Capital Gain** $0.00 $90.91
*Assumes personal tax rate of 35 percent and holding period ofmore than
six months.
**Accrued capital gains will generate a future taxobligation if realized.
A recent estimate of the effective tax rate on accruedcapital gains is about
5 percent.-6-
gain is accrued and not realized.
To make the share repurchase strategy absolutely clear, consider the
simple example outlined -in Table 1. A company is originally financed by the
issue of 100 shares at $10 each. The company uses the $1000 proceeds to
purchase productive capital and after a year it has realized a $100 profit.
The competitive market value of the firm is now $1100 ($11 per share) as the
company now consists of a fully restored $1000 machine and $100 cash.
Consider two strategies of returning the $100 earnings to the
shareholders. If the money is paid out as a dividend, then the personal tax
bill will be $35, if the marginal tax rate of the equity holders is
35 percent. The net of tax receipts from the dividend are $65. The value of
the company would return to $1000 or $10 per share after the dividend payment.
On the other hand, if the firm used its $100 to buy 9.09 of its shares at a
price of $11, then the total realized gain by those who sell their shares to
the firm is $9.09, assuming that the sellers are among those who originally
financed the firm at a $10 per share price, and the tax on that $9.09 would be
at long term capital gains rates. Under current law there is a 60 percent
exclusion on long term gains, so that only $3.64 would be subject to full
personal taxation. If the appropriate tax rate were again 35 percent, that
tax bill would amount to $1.27 and the stockholders would have net of tax
proceeds of $98.73.
Note that in this example the company's shares remain at $11 after the
repurchase and thus the remaining 90.91 shares each have an accrued gain of
one dollar. These accrued gains will generate some taxes for the government,
although the present value of those tax collections depends on average holding—7-
periods, as well as the use of the escape of capital gains taxes whichpass
through estates.
This example highlights the much lower personal taxes whichresult from
share repurchases relative to dividends. Evenso, it still may exaggerate
what would actually be paid with share repurchase. In thereal world,
investors have bought their shares at different times andat different prices,
and those most likely to actually tender their shares backto the company will
be those with the lowest reservation price on holding the shares.These most
likely would be shareholders who have actually lostmoney on their
investments, particularly those who have held the shares less than sixmonths
and who may be able to fully deduct their losses. This indicatesthat the
government may actually get no immediate revenue from those who receive the
corporate cash. The example also illustrates that even when the tax rateon
realized capital gains was the same as that on dividends, thegovernment's
contemporaneous tax collections would be lower with share repurchase (because
most of the money received is treated as a return of basis),as would the
present value of its eventual tax receipts.
One interesting aspect of share repurchase is that shareholdersare
nearly indifferent to the price offered in a share repurchase plan which is
accomplished through a tender offer. The point is that in a fundamentalway
they are buying the shares from themselves, so the indifferencecomes from
their being both buyer and seller. Consider what wouldhappen to the above
example if the firm offered to buy 8 shares at $12.50 rather than 9.09 at
$11.00. Shareholders as a group still get $100 cash and the firm isstill
worth $1000 after the transaction. In some sense there -isa transfer between-8-
those who sell and those who don't if the firm pays an above market price for
the shares it recaptures, but this effect is diminished by the fact that if
the offer is oversubscribed and the shares are repurchased from those who
offer to sell on a pro-rata basis. As long as all shareholders have an equal
right to participate, then it is again hard to argue that there is a
significant transfer among shareholders. There is a secondary tax difference.
In the example of Table 1, the total realized capital gain would be $20 at the
$12.50 price, while -it was $9.09 at $11.00 per share.
While I have emphasized the personal tax advantage of share repurchase,
there are other reasons for this practice. One is that it is a mechanism for
increasing the firm's debt-equity ratio. As mentioned above, the standard
wisdom is that a firm's debt-equity ratio is determined by a tradeoff between
the tax advantage of debt and the costs of its resulting inflexibility in
times of crisis. However, if there is a change in the underlying riskiness of
the firm (perhaps due to the maturing of a market or the resolution of some
technological uncertainties), the firm may want to operate with a higher
leverage ratio to enjoy the tax advantages of debt. Or, once the firm has
achieved its desired debt-equity ratio, the stockmarket could increase the
valuation of the shares and thus automatically lower leverage. The firm might
want to counter the automatic unlevering that occurs with a rise in the
stockmarket. Share repurchase can be a mechanism for increasing leverage. It
may be a better mechanism for this transitional purpose than an increased
dividend (suggested by the work of Feldstein and Green (1983)) because of the
penalty that the market imposes on firms which subsequently cut their
dividend.2 Taken together with the previous observation that shareholders are—9-
approximately indifferent regarding the price of a share repurchase, this
implies that a large increase in equity values such as that of thepast three
years may encourage share repurchases, rather than discourage them asseems to
be the conventional wisdom.
Of course, the argument that share repurchases occur toimplement an
optimal debt-equity ratio is itself a tax driven argument. In thiscase it is
the corporate tax faced by equity which is being avoidedby the absorption of
equity, rather than the personal tax which would accompany a dividendpayment.
Another reason that one might expect to observe firmsbuying back their
own shares in preference to paying dividends is that doing so could bepart of
an anti-takeover strategy (Simon (1986)).If a company pays cash out as a
dividend, then the cash is given to all shareholders in proportion to their
share holdings. However, if the cash is used to make a sharerepurchase
tender offer, only those who tender their shares (or a rata proportion of
those tendered) will receive cash from the firm. Due to different
transactions costs, tax situations, and expectations about the firm's
prospects there exists a distribution over prices at which different
shareholders are willing to sell. The cash dividend doesn'tchange that
distribution, while the share repurchase buys out those with the lowest
reservation prices, leaving behind those who would sell only when offereda
premium above the tender offer price. Since a successful raider must obtain
51 percent of the outstanding shares, the fact that those with the lowest
reservation prices have been taken out of the distribution by a share
repurchase raises the cost of a takeover. This explanation is consistent with
the empirical observation that merger activity and sharerepurchase have-10-
increased simultaneously in the last few years, although other theories might
also explain both practices.
In fact, I assert that, in the absence of informational problems and
transactions costs, buying the shares in another company is nearly equivalent
to buying back your own shares. Rather than returning cash to the
shareholders, the firm instead buys a financial investment. If the market
value of the acquired asset is equal to what is paid for it (and there -is no
evidence that the rate of return on the common stock of the acquiring firm is
abnormal, whereas there is an excess return enjoyed by the holders of the
securities of the acquired firm (Dennis and McConnell (1986)), then in the
absence of transactions costs the acquisition is as good as cash to the
holders of the stock in the acquiring firm. If there are transactions costs,
they would have to be taken into account since some investors might now prefer
cash and some investors may want to rebalance their portfolio after the
acquisition.
Another way to note the near equivalence of cash mergers and share
repurchase is to consider an example with two firms. The owners of firms A
and B are nearly indifferent to whether both firms buy back ten percent of
their own stock or whether they buy ten percent of each other. The cash flow
to the investors is the same, the individual who owns a proportion of MB is
treated exactly equivalently, and the individual who owns either A or B has a
claim of equal value. One qualifier is that if either A or B pays out
dividends, then each corporation will face a tax on 15 percent of the
dividends it receives from the other. Also, the proposition made above that
shareholders are nearly indifferent regarding the price offered in a share—11—
repurchase tender offer program is clearly not true if the acquirer is an
outside firm. Rather than the shareholders buying a fraction ofoutstanding
shares from themselves, they now are selling them to an outsider, and
therefore the common logic that the higher the price the better applies.
Cash mergers and leveraged buyouts (LBOs), much in the news of late,are
just the complete purchase of all of the shares of a company by another
company. They often involve large sums of money being paid from the corporate
sector to stockholders and therefore are a significant determinant of the
value of equity. In a merger or acquisition, the appreciation of the
securities (which may reflect previous retained earnings) will be taxedas a
capital gain rather than as ordinary income. Since in this case (unlike the
situation with share repurchase), we are mainly comparing realizedcapital
gains with dividends, the tax advantage of a cash merger will be diminished if
the capital gains exclusion is eliminated, as nowappears likely. However, a
fraction of the money used for the acquisition will be a nontaxable return of
basis.
So far, I have been arguing that there are significant tax advantages to
paying out whatever cash is to be returned to equity investors in a form other
than dividends, as well as the advantage of increased leverage. In this
paper, I present data which indicates that indeed most of the cash received by
stockholders from firms is the last two years has been due to share repurchase
and cash mergers. In 1985, at least $125 billion was paid out in share
acquisitions, whereas dividends amounted to $83.5 billion. This phenomenon is
relatively new, since the the first half of the 1970s the total money paid by
corporations for equity acquisition amounted to only about 15 percent of—12—
dividends.I also demonstrate that the growth in share acquisitions is
consistent with firms taking advantage of the tax treatment of debt in
response to their -increased market values.
The next section of the paper presents the data regarding the magnitude
of these cash flows between firms and stockholders. The primary data source
is the Monthly Stock Returns File of the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). The second section of the paper examines where the money to
make these payments comes from. One possibility is that they are directly
substituting for dividends, and that dividends have declined as these
practices have grown. This hypothesis is addressed by fitting aggregate time
series equations for dividends and looking at the out-of-sample forecast
residuals for recent years. As funds are fungible, it is always difficult to
be precise as to where particular monies are coming from. Other possibilities
in this case are that the money is being raised -in debt markets and that
effectively firms are changing their debt—equity ratios (in which case
dividends and share repurchases are complements), or that declining industries
are depreciating their capital in their traditional business and either
returning the funds to their investors (share repurchase) or making
investments on their behalf.
The third section addresses the question of what is the cost to the
Treasury of these nondiv-idend cash payments. The answer depends on what firms
would do if these payments were disallowed or taxed as dividends. If firms
would pay these sums out to equity holders nonetheless, then the loss depends
on the difference between the current taxation applying to these payments and
their taxation as dividends. However, if they would retain these earnings and-13-
reduce borrowing, the loss is the present value of the future corporation
income tax which would result from the higher level of corporate equity if
these nondividend payments were not made. Both alternative scenarios are
considered. The paper concludes in section four with an assessment of what we
have learned regarding the nondividend payments to shareholders, and some
speculation as to how the new tax bill will affect these practices.
1. How Large is It?
There -is surprisingly little data regarding these non—dividend cash
payments between firms and stockholders, particularly share repurchases.
There -is no separate entry for them in the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds
accounts and my contacts with the Fed have indicated that they do not have
accurate information regarding this cash flow. There are some sources
regarding mergers and acquisitions and those figures are reported here.
To gain some feel for the magnitude of share repurchases, I examined the
CRSP Monthly Stock Returns File which contains monthly information on the
number of shares outstanding. Only New York Stock Exchange securities were
examined and the period covered was January 1970 through December 1985. Each
decrease in the number of shares outstanding (adjusted for splits and reverse
splits) was taken to be a share repurchase and the amount of cash represented
by that share repurchase was determined by valuing the decrease in shares at
the average of the price at the end of the preceeding month and the price at
the end of the month in which the reduction occured. Overall, the sample
covered 3,211 firms over 192 months.-14-
Table 2
Values of Mergers and Acquisitions, Share Repurchases, and Dividends










1970 2,824 1,213 22,500
1971 4,037 736 22,900
1972 2,407 2,121 24,400
1973 2,186 1,585 27,000
1974 2,215 2,059 29,700
1975 1,320 2,139 29,600
1976 5,324 1,904 34,600
1977 6,020 3,368 39,500
1978 7,660 5,804 44,700
1979 13,992 5,651 50,100
1980 19,845 7,802 54,700
1981 35,342 15,464 63,600
1982 36,322 11,700 66,900
1983 26,096 24,485 70,800
1984 62,690 29,098 78,100
1985 94,809 27,294 83,500
Sources: Column 1 is the author's computations based on the CRSP tape.It
represents the total value of firms which disappear from the NYSE,
where value is determined by multiplying the number of shares
outstanding the month before disappearance by the price at that
time.
Column 2 is the author's computations based on the CRSP tape. It
represents the sum of the value of all monthly decreases in the
number of shares outstanding for NYSE stocks, where the value of the
decrease in shares is determined using the average of the price at
the end of the preceding month and the price at the end of the month
in which the reduction occurred.
Column 3 is from the Economic Report of the President, February
1986, column 4, Table 6-84, page 351.—15—
The results of this procedure are shown in column 2 of Table 2.They
show that the value of shares repurchased moved trendlessly between1970 and
1976 at level of approximately $2 billion or less. By 1980, theaggregate
figure had grown to almost $8 billion and it continued to grow rapidly,rising
to more than $29 billion in 1984. There was a slight decline in1985,
although the figure of $27 billion is still very large.
For several reasons, the estimates of column 2 should be takenonly as
rough, but very conservative estimates. First, only monthly net declines in
shares outstanding are valued, rather than the more appropriate, but
unavailable, gross number of shares repurchased. The distinction should be
made clear if you think of a firm which repurchases 100,000 shares butuses
50,000 of them to cover exercised executive stock options. Thecompany
shareholders receive cash for 100,000 of their shares, but the CRSP based
technique of this paper will only record that 50,000 shares were bought by the
company.,3 By examining some 1985 and 1986 NYSE data on changes inTreasury
stock for listed companies, I estimate that the valuation of net rather than
gross stock repurchases may cause the figures of column 2 to be underestimated
by as much as 20 percent.4
Second, only NYSE securities are covered in the procedure behind the
figures in the first two columns of Table 2. While they represent the vast
majority of dividends, assets, and profits in the U.S., the strategies being
examined here, particularly share repurchase, are also likely to occur in
small, closely-held companies where possible information problems relating to
corporate financial behavior are much less severe than in large corporate giants.
Third, while CRSP offers accurate data on the change in the number of shares-16-
outstanding, I have no information on the price at which those shares were removed
from the market. The procedures of using an average of the end of previous
month's price and the price at the end of the month in which the repurchase oc-
curred is probably downward biased. In fact, those repurchase programs which are
accomplished using a tender offer usually involve a premium above market price,
and therefore involve more cash than the procedure of this paper will record.5
The first column of Table 2 contains information about mergers and
acquisitions from the same sample of months and firms. The figures represent
the value of shares of companies which disappear from the NYSE, where value is
determined by multiplying the number of shares outstanding at the end of the
month before disappearance by the price at that time. The results again show
a series with no tendency to growth from 1970 to 1975. During that period,
aggregate mergers and acquisitions averaged less than $2.5 billion compared to
dividends which averaged about $25 billion. By 1979, total mergers and
acquisitions were almost $14 billion and in 1985 they surpassed dividends by
totalling almost $95 billion. In fact in 1985 total dividends in the economy
were only 68 percent as large as the value of NYSE mergers and share
repurchases.
As with column 2, the figures of column 1 should be treated as rough
approximations. They cover only NYSE securities, they do not include partial
acquisitions, the price at which the shares are valued is certainly biased
downwards in this case, and they do not separate cash from stock-swap mergers.
In recent years, at least 83 percent of the largest mergers and acquisitions
have used cash or equivalents rather than an equity exchange,6 but it is








MERGERS, BUYBACKS, AND DIVIDENDS
In Constant 1982 Dollars
0 M&A +Buybacks Dividends
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984
Year-18-
Itis my personal assessment that the numbers are once again fairly
conservative. The third column of Table 2 reports aggregate dividends of the
corporate sector. It is an extremely stable series as is well documented
(Lintner (1956), Brittain (1966), and Shiller (1981)).
Figure 1 displays the same information, although now expressed in
constant 1982 dollars, where the GNP deflator has been used to deflate the
figures of Table 2. The figure clearly shows that both mergers and share
repurchases were relatively insignificant until 1978, but since then they have
experienced explosive growth.
Table 3 contains information on the 25 largest mergers and acquisitions
in 1984 and Table 4 has the same information for 1985. The data were compiled
by Mergers and Acquisitions. For 1984, the 25 largest deals amounted to
almost half of the value of all mergers and acquisitions. Even the top 25
were dominated by the largest three, all involving oil companies buying other
oil companies. The total cost of the acquisitions of Gulf, Getty, and
Superior alone amounted to almost $30 billion, or nearly 25 percent of all
such activity. Table 4 shows that no 1985 merger was as large as the three
giant oil deals -in 1984. However, total mergers and acquisitions were larger,
with even the 25th largest deal amounting to $1 billion. Table 4 also shows
that foreign investors became a major factor in equity mergers and
acquisitions in 1985. The purchase of U.S. firms by non-U.S. firms went from
$8 billion in 1984 to almost $18 billion in 1985. I note that the aggregate
information shown for 1984 and 1985 in Tables 3 and 4 exceeds the
corresponding figures in Table 2 and Figure 1. Part of the explanation is
that the Mergers and Acquisitions data of Tables 3 and 4 include partial-19-
Table 3
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Total Value of 25 Largest Completed
Mergers and Acquisitions
Value of all Mergers and Acquisitions between
U.S. Firms
Non-U.S. Firms Acquiring U.S. Firms
U.S. Firms Acquiring Non-U.S. Firms





Cash and Equivalents include cash, bonds and debentures, and preferred stock.
The figures shown are lower bound estimates of cash and equivalents.
1. EDS stockholders had an option to exchange stock instead of cash.
Sources: First three columns, Mergers and Acquisitions, Vol. 19, No. 5
(May/June 1985).
Fourth column, various issues of Mergers and Acquisitions and the










































































































parts of Gulf & Western
13.6 of Unocal
MGIC Investment
Total Value of 25 Largest Completed
Mergers and Acquisitions
Value of all Mergers and Acquisitions between
U.S. Firms
Non-U.S. Firms Acquiring U.S. Firms
U.S. Firms Acquiring Non-U.S. Firms





Cash and Equivalents include cash, bonds and debentures, and preferred stock.
The figures shown are lower bound estimates of cash and equivalents.
*Details regarding merger terms could not be determined.
1. American Hospital Supply stockholders had an option to exchange stock
instead of cash.
Sources: First three columns, Mergers and Acquisitions, Vol. 20, No. 5
(May/June 1986). Fourth column, various issues of Mergers and








































































PPG Inds. Inc. 530
Chrysler Corp. 472
Times Mirror Co. 459
Pepsico 458
Ford Motor 449





Knight Ridder Newspapers 334
Raytheon 333
Santa Fe Southn Pacific Corp. 302
Consolidated Edison Co. NY Inc. 289
General Electric 283
Source: The values of shares repurchased were obtained from SEC
10—K filings and annual reports for 1985.
We considered as potential candidates firms evidencing
large repurchase by either of two sources: either being
amongst the 45 largest as derived by our CRSP
manipulations, or having significant increases in the
shares of Treasury stock holdings, and thus repurchase
value, as obtained by our NYSE Treasury stock report
manipulations.-22-
acquisitions, non NYSE firms, and even non-U.S. firms. However, I do not mean
to imply that the two sources could be exactly reconciled. On the other hand,
both indicate the same order of magnitude for the value of mergers and
acqu i sit ions.
Table 5 shows the 25 largest share repurchase programs for 1985. The
list was generated by identifying the 45 firms with the largest net share
acquisition programs from the CRSP file, and augmenting that sample by those
firms whose share repurchase programs appear to be large in the New York Stock
Exchange data. The annual reports and SEC 10-K forms for all of these firms
were examined, and the values here are derived from these reports. The oil
companies are extremely prominent on the list, as they are on the mergers and
acquisitions tables above. The oil companies were experiencing large cash
flows due to the high price of crude, but had excess capacity in refining as
the high prices had reduced demand. This so-called "cash-cow" situation is
exactly the type of situation where one would expect the firm to transmit cash
or value to shareholders via a non-dividend technique. Exxon alone
repurchased more than $5 billion of its shares in the two years 1984 and 1985,
a sum which exceeds Exxon's dividends for the same two years. The non-oil
company's on the list also appear to be mature companies in slow growth
industries. In subsequent research, I intend to examine econometrically the
determinants of which firms are most likely to engage in repurchase programs.
The overall conclusion that I reach from the data gathered so far is that
non-dividend forms of payment have been growing rapidly, now exceed dividends
in aggregate, and that this may be a mechanism for investment to be
reallocated away from slow growth sectors of the economy to other areas—23-
offering higher growth. In this regard, it should be noted that even when one
oil company absorbs another with a cash merger, some cash is reallocated out
of the industry since equity holders receive cash from the acquiring firm,
which they then can reallocate in whatever manner they choose.
2. Have Firms Reduced Dividends?
Corporations are now paying out over $100 billion per year in
non-dividend cash to equity holders. At some level it is impossible to track
down the origins of that money, since the interchangeability of funds renders
it fundamentally impossible to match sources and uses. However, it still is
interesting to investigate what other behavior has accompanied the growth in
cash flows from share absorption.
The first source suspected might be dividends. If it has become
recognized that share repurchases and cash mergers are tax-preferred relative
to dividends, then one would expect dividends to have declined as these
practices have grown. It has long been known that aggregate dividends are a
very smooth series, with dividend levels adjusting to changes in earnings with
fairly long lags (see, for example, Lintner (1956), Brittain (1966), and
Auerbach (1982)).
I wish to test this substitutability hypothesis. Thus, I have fit simple
partial adjustment models similar to those used by Auerbach (1982). In the
equations shown in Table 6, dividends depend on the previous year's dividends,
profits, a correction for the real inflation-adjusted cost of debt, and q (the
ratio of the financial valuation of the firm to the replacement cost of its-24—
Table 6
Alternative Models of Corporate Dividend Behavior

























2 .89 .86 .89
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.59 1.65 1.94
Out of SamplePredictions: Dividends
Year Actual
Predicted
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
1983 68.2 66.3 [2.8]+ 66.9 [1.9] 67.5 [1.1]
1984 72.2 68.0** [5.8] 66.9 [7.4] 69.8 [2.6]
69.6*** [3.7] 68.0 [5.8] 70.4 [2.6]





**Using predicted lagged dividends.
***Using actual lagged dividends.
Percentage prediction error in brackets.—25-
assets).7 Three alternative specifications are estimated.
The 1960-82 aggregate data used in the estimations are shown in Table 6.
The resulting estimated equations are then used to predict the level of
dividends in 1983 and 1984. The results strongly suggest that the source of
the cash is not a lowering of dividends. All three specifications of the
dividend equation continue to track dividends rather well, with the residuals
in 1983 and 1984 always being positive. This indicates that dividends were
slightly higher than the equations would have forecasted. Equation 1 and
Equation 3 show profits to be a significant variable in determining dividends.
The long run equilibrium payout rate out of inflation adjusted profits ranges
from 30 to 37.5 percent. Of course, the stability of dividends and the market
penalty for failing to fulfill expectations regarding dividends is well
known. Once the practice of paying dividends and periodically increasing them
is established, the market makes it difficult to not satisfy this expectation.
Despite the cash payouts for share acquisition, the total sources of
funds raised or generated by the corporate sector have continued to increase
in the last few years. Total internal cash generated in the corporate sector
increased 66 percent between 1981 and 1985, going from $213 billion to almost
$355 billion (Flow of Funds (1986)). This increase alone is more than
sufficient to account for the increase in equity absorption. The fungibility
point made earlier is highlighted when one notes that the corporate sector has
been increasing its bond and bank debts by over $100 billion per year in the
last several years. This source is also large enough to fund the share
acquisitions.
The available aggregate information weakly supports the hypothesis that-26-
Table 7
Debt and Equity for U.S. Corporations
(billions $)
Total Value
Total Value of CorporateDebt-
Net Newof Debtat Net Stock Stock Stock at Equity
Debt Year End Issuance AppreciationYear End Ratio
1980 38.6 418.8 11.6 381.2 1,572.3 .266
1981 30.4 449.2 -23.5 -43.8 1,505.0 .298
1982 48.0 497.2 -20.3 236.4 1,721.1 .289
1983 46.2 543.4 25.8 275.3 2,022.3 .269
1984 80.8 624.2 -82.8 82.7 2,378.2 .262
Source: "Prospects for Financial Markets," 1980-1985, New York, NY: Salomon
Brothers Inc.-27-
firms are repurchasing equity with debt-financed funds to achieve theirtarget
leverage ratios. The aggregate debt-equity ratio of U.S. corporations in 1984
and 1985 was approxiamtely the same as it had been in 1979-1981,despite the
large increase in equity values. The aggregate figures compiled by Salomon
Brothers are shown in Table 7.It shows that U.S. corporations have been on
average absorbing equity and issuing debt, so that the net effect has been
relatively constant leverage rates, despite the rally in equity market values.
3. How Much Does It Cost?
The next question I address is how much does the Treasury lose because of
the use of non-dividend forms of payment between firms and their stockholders.
It is a somewhat difficult issue for a number of reasons. Fundamentally,we
do not know what the firm would have done if share repurchase and cashmergers
were disallowed. One possibility is that they would increase dividends as the
only remaining mechanism to absorb equity in establishing their desired
debt-equity ratio. Of course, the optimal debt-equity ratio itself is a
function of the tax laws. A second possibility is that the funds would be
retained in the corporation and the firm's new borrowing would have been
reduced. Either of these possibilities imply that share repurchase and
acquisition cost the Treasury large amounts of tax revenue.I will assess
this cost for these two scenarios.
If the alternative would have been an equal amount of payments as
dividends, the revenue loss to the Treasury is the difference between the
average marginal tax rate on dividends and the effective tax rate on the share-28-
purchase cash payments. The average marginal tax rate applying to dividend
distributions depends on a number of factors. First, within households, some
will have not used up the $100 per person ($200 per couple) dividend
exclusion. Second, one would expect that people would arrange their
portfolios such that those with low marginal tax rates hold assets which are
heavily taxed (e.g. stocks which offer high dividend yields such as utilities)
while those with high marginal tax rates would hold more lightly taxed
securities (such as companies which retain earnings or repurchase shares, or,
at the extreme, municipal bonds). Certainly, these clientele effects exist,
although their empirical strength is somewhat uncertain.8 Of course,
substantial amounts of equity are held by insurance companies, pension funds,
and non—profit institutions, which are not taxed. Feldstein and Jun (1986)
have estimated a time series of the effective average marginal tax rates on
dividends, taking into account the proportion of stocks held by households,
insurance companies, and nontaxable holders. Their series is reproduced as
the second column of Table 8. Using these rates, it is rather simple to
determine how much tax would have been paid if these nondividend payments to
stockholders continued and were taxed as dividends or, in fact, companies
replaced them with increased dividends.9 However, to know how much extra the
government would collect, we must know how much tax was indeed collected from
these payments in the current situation.
The effective tax rate applying to the non-dividend cash payments under
current law is undoubtedly quite low. As was demonstrated in the example of
Table 1, share repurchases create a capital gain of equivalent magnitude to-29-
Table 8
Loss in Tax Revenues Due to Nondividend Cash Payments
































































































Sources: was taken from Column 3, Table A-4, of Tax rate on dividends column
Feldstein and Jun (1986).
Additional tax revenues were derived by multiplying the magnitudes
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 of this paper by the tax rate on
dividends less 5 percent. The 5 percent represents the effective
marginal tax rate on accrued capital gains and is roughly consistent
with Protopapadakis (1983).-30-
the cash payment of dividends, but most of that capital gain is accrued rather
than realized. Most of the money received by the actual sellers is a return
of basis, with the remainder being taxed at capital gains rates. Under
current law, only 40 percent of realized long term capital gains are taxed.
The effective rate of taxation on accrued gains is much lower, due to both
deferral and the fact that the gains on assets which pass through estates
completely escape taxation. A recent times series of estimates of effective
marginal tax rates on accrued capital gains, taking these considerations into
account, put those rates between 4 and 6 percent (Protopapadakis (1983)).
The tax situation with cash mergers, is similar to share repurchase.
Relative to the payment of a dividend, the holders of the acquiring company
experience an accrued capital gain. The owners of the acquired company pay
capital gains taxes on the appreciation of their securities, but again the
majority of the money received is usually a non-taxed return of basis. With
this background, I have assumed that the tax rate applicable to the
non—dividend cash flows was 5 percent over the entire 1970 to 1985 period.
This is consistent with Protopapadakis' estimates and, further, small errors
in this figure are relatively insignificant compared to the magnitude of the
tax rate on dividends shown in Table 8.
With these tax rate assumptions, Table 8 indicates that the practice of
share acquisition costs the government very little between 1970 and 1975
(roughly $1 billion per year), but that its cost has risen sharply since, to
more than $27 billion in 1985. This assumes that the alternative to
acquisition is the increase of dividend payments. Interestingly, this $27
billion per year exceeds the intended shift between the personal and corporate-31-
taxation in the new tax bill. This exercise provides one indication howthe
adjustment of household and firm behavior can significantly affect revenue
projections, from any proposed change of incentives in the tax code.
In the previous section, we found that dividends have not declined
relative to equity earnings, thus it can be argued that dividendsare not
likely to be the behavior which is depressed as a result of share acquisition.
What may be depressed is the outstanding quantity ofcorporate equity. If
share purchases effectively reduce equity and increase debt (i.e. if the
acquisitions are financed by borrowing), then the Treasury loses inpresent
value terms much more than is reflected in Table 8. The loss is not
immediate, but results from the lower future corporation income taxreceipts.
By absorbing equity, the corporate sector is escaping from the double taxation
imposed on equity. This opportunity exists because the corporate tax applied
only to equity investments, since interest is deductible.
At a marginal corporate income tax rate of 46 percent, the value of the
government's equity claim on an extra dollar's worth of earnings is 85 percent
as large as the value of the claim of the investors. The government gains 46
cents from a marginal dollar of pre-tax profit, while thecompany keeps 54
cents. 10
Table 9 shows the loss in present value terms of the Treasury's tax
receipts, under the assumption that share acquisition programs have reduced
corporate equity.The figures indicate that the loss to the Treasury is
insignificant before 1975, but exceeds $100 billion in 1985. That is, the
absorption of corporate equity which occurred in 1985 reduces the present
value of the corporate tax receipts by slightly more than $100 billion. The
annual loss, of course, is much lower than this, perhaps only $5 billion.-32-
Table 9
Loss in the Present Value of Tax Revenues Due to Nondividend Cash Payments
Assuming Alternative -is Less Borrowing
Sources: Column 1 is column 7 of Table B1 of Feldstein and Jun (1986).
Effective Loss in Loss in
Corporate Corporate Present ValuePresent Value Total
Tax Rate Tax Rate on Of Taxes Of Taxes DuePresent Value
On Pre-Tax Post-Tax Due to To Share Loss in Tax
Year Earnings Earnings Cash Mergers Repurchases Collection
1970 .492 .9685 2,734.625 1,175.036 3,909.661
1971 .480 .923 3,725.897 679.460 4,405.357
1972 .480 .923 2,221.660 1,958.112 4,179.772
1973 .480 .923 2,017.360 1,462.926 3,480.286
1974 .480 .923 2,044.462 1,900.572 3,945.034
1975 .480 .923 1,218.488 1,974.106 3,192.594
1976 .480 .923 4,913.642 1,757.588 6,671.230
1977 .480 .923 5,556.678 3,108.917 8,665.595
1978 .480 .923 7,069.812 5,356.655 2,426.467
1979 .460 .852 11,921.454 4,814.445 16,735.899
1980 .460 .852 16,907.578 6,647.019 23,554.597
1981 .460 .852 30,111.670 13,175.314 43,286.984
1982 .460 .852 30,946.398 9,968.533 40,914.931
1983 .460 .852 22,234.051 20,860.831 43,094.882
1984 .460 .852 53,411.811 24,791.368 78,203.179
1985 .460 .852 80,777.070 23,254.706 104,031.776











This table assumes that the personal tax bill is equivalent forcorporate debt
and equity, and that the transfer of capital between the two forms simply cuts
corporate collections. While the tax rates faced by households on the return
to debt may exceed the rates on equity return, a large fraction of debt is
held in tax sheltered investments such as pension funds.
Each of the two hypotheses indicate that the Treasury losses are
extremely large due to these practices. The former theory implies that the
government is losing tax on dividends, while the latter suggests that it is
losing corporation income tax revenue. Relative to models which do not
incorporate behavioral change, each of the alternative hypotheses suggest
massive revenue effects.
4. Conclusion
Corporations in the United States are now making nondividend cash
payments to shareholders the sum of which exceeds that of dividends. These
payments have not received much attention by research economists, but their
growth in magnitude challenges the conventional model of share valuation, and
certainly affects estimates of the taxes collected on corporate source income.
Share acquisitions (both share repurchase and cash mergers) may well be
motivated by tax minimizing behavior. In fact, there are two potential
sources of tax savings from these activities. First, if because of share
acquisition, dividends are lower than they otherwise would have been, then
there is a tax saving at the personal level. With share acquisition by
corporations, most of the cash returned to shareholders is a return of basis.—34-
The magnitude of the taxable capital gain depends on the form of the share
acquisition. In the case of a firm repurchasing its own shares, most of the
resulting capital gains are accrued rather than realized. The deferral
advantage of accrued capital gain will continue to exist even when realized
capital gains are fully taxed under the new federal law.
The second tax motivation for share acquisition is simply to escape the
double taxation of equity. Both dividends and share acquisition eliminate
equity. The tax saving results from the fact that equity earnings are subject
to the corporation income tax whereas debt interest -is not. As the market
expects increases in dividends to be sustained, repurchase is an attractive
mechanism to decrease equity. The tax advantage of leverage will continue
with the new tax law.
A leading model of optimal financial policy has firms balancing the tax
advantages of debt against the increased chance of incurring bankruptcy costs.
The tremendous rise -in equity values of the past three years may have given
firms a capacity to carry more debt and absorb some equity. This hypothesis
is consistent with the observations of explosive growth in non-cash payments
to equity holders and the fact that dividends are, if anything, also greater
than their historic pattern.
In evaluating corporate behavior and tax policy, it is almost certainly
useful to know what is happening. In 1985, corporations purchased well over
$100 billion of equities and, in present value terms, this may cost the U.S.
Treasury as much as $100 billion. Clearly, there has been a major change in
corporate financial behavior which necessitates future research.-35-
Footnotes
*Stanford University and National Bureau of Economic Research.
Preliminary draft of a paper to be presented at the Economics of Tax
Policy conference of the National Bureau of Economic Research to be held in
Washington, D.C. on November 17, 1986.It is not for quotation without
permission. This work was made possible by the tireless work and intellectual
stimuli provide by Laurie B. Simon, who is also doing researchon this
subject. It also benefited greatly from the research assistance of Karen
Prindle and Karen Van Nuys. Larry Summers and Jim Poterbagave me extremely
useful advice.
1.While under the assumptions of Modigliani—Miller (1958)(in the world
without taxes and bankruptcy costs), "the market value ofone firm is
independent of its capital structure (p. 268)," the optimal capitalstructure
becomes 100% debt with the incorporation of corporate taxes(Modigliani-Miller
(1963)). However, there exists voluminous literature on the effect of
bankruptcy costs limiting the use of this tax-advantaged debt. See, for
example, Stiglitz (1972), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Kim (1978), andmore
recently Modigliani (1982) and Gordon (1982), where it is argued "that thetax
advantage to using debt is in equilibrium just offset at the marginby the
additional agency costs and possible bankruptcy costs incurredas a result of
the extra debt" (Gordon (1982), p. 462).
2.The fact that capital markets punish dividend cuts withlarge stock-price
reductions is documented in Charest (1978), Aharony andSwary (1980), and
Jensen (1986).-36-
3. For example, in the first quarter of 1985, IBM repurchased 1.575 million
shares, but issued 1.35 million as part of defined contribution saving plans
and stock options for employees.
4. This estimate is made by examining the monthly gross increases and
decreases from Treasury stock in data made available by New York Stock
Exchange for 1985.
5.Dann (1981) cites that "the tender offer price is usually higher than the
market price at the time of the offer (p. 114, footnote 3)," and that while
"open market repurchases occur more frequently than do tender offers to
repurchase ...(they)are generally of much smaller magnitude (p. 115)."
6. This calculation -is the result of the comparison between total value and
cash and equivalence of the 1985 Mergers and Acquisitions in Table 4.





where is dividends for year t and is the long run equilibrium or
desired level of dividends. 0* is assumed to depend on corporate profits
corrected for inflation (i.e., with the capital consumption adjustments,
inventory valuation adjustment, and a recognition of the gain on the net
corporate debt due to inflation) and q.
8. The clientele effect was originally suggested by Modigliani-Miller
(1961), and has been quantified by Elton and Gruber (1970), and Pettit (1977).
9. This assumes that the effective average marginal tax rate for the pool of
firms using repurchase is the same as for the market at large. We will not
consider issues of self-selection here.
10.In fact, the Treasury's claim may be worth more than 85 percent of the-37-
value of the investor's claim, since the 54 cents faces further taxationat
the personal level.-38-
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